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Book Review
In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. by Bernard Williams
(Princeton University Press, 164 pp. 2005.)
To get right to the essence of it, this book is by turns: intriguing, maddeningly organized, intelligent,
sensitive, digressive, provocative, and probably more or less irrelevant. For readers, such as myself, who
have known Williams largely through his work in Problems of the Self and Ethics and the Limits of
Philosophy, this work represents something of a truly surprising turn, a consistent, almost obsessive,
pursuit of distinctively political issues. But while the subject is new, the temperament is familiar. In
taking up these political matters, Williams shows all his virtues. The subject at hand is invariably
marinated in his characteristic “now from this light, now from that” intelligence; he can at times write
with a kind of snappy clarity that is most appealing; and he shows a welcome originality on certain
matters, such as cross cultural and cross historical comparisons. (See especially in this regard the chapter
“Human Rights and Relativism.”) But the work also showcases his characteristic limitations. There is for
example a meandering quality to a lot of the arguments, a kind of Oxbridge high table confidence that it
is perfectly all right to take up an issue with no clear point of view or systematic conclusion in the
offing, so long as each paragraph displays the right level of balance and erudition. But the real difficulty
with this book, its fundamental limitation, is that it very rarely takes up in any detail the various
arguments we have from the early and later Rawls. And, it turns out that Williams is preoccupied with a
fair number of the very same issues that are signature issues in Rawls’ arguments, for example: the
degree to which the justification for the state must be normative, as opposed to merely pragmatic; how
non-liberal a state could be and still be legitimate; how to think of political equality and equality of
opportunity. As a result, the failure to rehearse Rawls’ position on these matters and then chart out (and
defend) whatever differences there are just leaves Williams, often as not, with a position that simply
strikes the reader as incomplete, undeveloped, the better known argument of his rival inevitably conjured
up in the reader’s mind by contrast, and generally providing a more satisfying treatment of the issue at
hand.
For example, in his chapter “The Idea of Equality” Williams thinks about what it means to claim people
are equal. He distinguishes between an empirical interpretation of equality among persons, which clearly
won’t do, (since persons are clearly not equal in any empirical way) and a platitudinous understanding,
the idea of persons being equal in simply virtue of their “common humanity.” (97) Williams argues,
rightly I think, that the second avenue may not be as vacuous as it first appears – the fact that persons
have “the capacity to feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations
represented in perception and in thought, and the capacity to feel affection for others, and the
consequences of this, connected with the frustration this affection, the loss of its objects” is not entirely
trivial, given that there are political and social arrangements that systematically neglect these facts over
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some groups, or fail to give them the weight they deserve. (99) But what of more robust notions of
equality among persons, the idea that persons deserve respect say in virtue of a distinct moral capacity, or
moral agency? (101) Williams is skeptical that it this idea, as Kant understood it at least, can go very far:
if we construe our “moral capacity as persons” in a wholly non-empirical way, then we cannot connect it
to responsibility in the world of action, which is surely central to being a moral agent. (103) Yet the idea
that there is more to persons than their talent or abilities has something to it, Williams thinks; the failed
inventor certainly experiences his own life as something more than that failure. Perhaps to respect
persons is just to see them as more than whatever is “dictated by the criteria of technical success or social
position”; persons are owed a kind of “effort of understanding” from their own point of view. (104-5)
While this understanding of what persons are owed, or what it means to see persons as sharing a common
humanity is not utterly without content, clearly, it is not a rich enough notion to provide much in the
way of political guidance. But this limitation to the general idea may be conceded and set aside. The
norm of equality gets a better chance of satisfactory elaboration, Williams thinks, when we turn to
equality of opportunity. Indeed, it may turn out that all equality, as a general political norm, may
plausibly amount to is the elaboration of what equality of opportunity requires in every relevant domain.
(Williams suggests this, thinks it may be right, but does not set out to defend so strong a claim
explicitly.) And clearly, articulating a notion of equality of opportunity will require explicitly saying what
is and is not a relevant reason for exclusion, what is and is not a satisfactory explanation for why it is
that people wind up unequally, when they do. In particular, we have to be sensitive of when reasons
which are operative are not in fact relevant. Consider an ancient society that attached high prestige to
being a member of the warrior class, and further assume that in that society only those from aristocratic
families could be warriors. Times change, protest occurs, and the aristocratic class announces that
competition for warrior membership will be open to all. However, if the poor farmers in this culture
remain severely malnourished, it is very cynical to think that in fact all have “equal opportunity” to be a
warrior. (110-111) Analogously, if all have equal opportunity to compete for entrance to Oxford, but if
only those from wealthy families get the education to do so realistically, as would have been the case
through much of Britain’s history, it would have been equally facile to say that Oxford, in say 1900, was
“open to all.” A similar point, sadly, can be made for reasonable health care for many Americans: it is
open to anyone if they have the money. “Having the money” is, to use Williams’s distinction, an
operative condition, but not a relevant reason. And so we may now say: only when the operative and the
relevant are in alignment, will we have true equality of opportunity. (107-110).
It is an interesting suggestion, but as it stands, it cannot be quite right, nor in so far as it is right, is it
always the most promising framework for approaching the norm of equality of opportunity within the
political. In the first place, we are often disinclined to make this distinction at all, disinclined to see “the
contingently operative” as, for precisely that reason, incompatible with as “the relevant.” Consider
athletic contexts: East Africans would seem to have the builds that give them terrific advantage as long
distance runners. Yet there is meaningful sense in which the opportunity to compete for the gold in long
distance running is genuinely open to all. Explanations by which someone comes to be the likely winner
of an otherwise open competition may be quite contingent but not for all that, appropriate objects of
political enmity. It may turn out that mathematical ability, or the reflexes by which some excel as fighter
pilots are largely hard wired – but no one, for all that, would begrudge the math professor or squadron
leader his position or his fame. Williams (like G.A. Cohen in his writings on welfare) seeks a
metaphysical distinction, seeks to draw a line between what is and what is not relevant, and then hopes
to map it directly onto the political arena. The results are predictably unsatisfactory. When he takes up
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what no one denies, that differences across families will strongly influence the ability of their children to
secure competitive education, we are, given this distinction between the relevant and the operative, just
left with an insuperable political problem. How, unless we were to dismantle the family, could we hope
to get equality of opportunity here, to make it such that only the relevant was operative? Yet if we do not
attack such powerfully operative, yet not morally relevant reasons, what does our commitment to
respecting the common humanity of all come down to? (113, 114) Williams warns us not to succumb to
the simplifying formulations of either side here – not to think that “equality of opportunity is the only
ideal that is at all practicable and equality of respect a vague and perhaps nostalgic illusion, or
alternatively, that equality of respect is genuine equality and equality of opportunity an inegalitarian
betrayal” (114). Clearly, equality opportunity is often not so practicable at all, and equality of respect, is
pretty vague, since it is, on this analysis, simply what we have when attending as best we can to this
relevant reasons/operative reasons distinction. We end (quite understandably) on a mildly pessimistic
note: we should just muddle through as best we can, “seek, in each situation, the best way of eating and
having as much cake as possible.” (114)
As I said earlier, the reader cannot help but think of the alternative approach defended by Rawls in A
Theory of Justice. There is a sense in which one might say: Rawls acknowledges the slipperiness of the
relevant reasons/operative reasons distinction, metaphysically understood, and fashions a distinctively
political solution that bypasses its otherwise paralyzing power. The theory of primary goods, and the
further idea of distributing those goods in accord with the difference principle, gives us a way of
respecting the equal worth of all while at the same time doing justice to merit and opportunity. It is a
distinctively political structure in which these ideals are acknowledged and reconciled. Rawls does not
have to say, in every case, what is and is not a relevant reason, nor, when we can specify a reason as not
relevant but operative, (as is the case with the role families play in a child’s talent) are we then, given
our commitment to this distinction and its importance in our theory of equality, committed to dismantling
that particular bit of social causation. Instead of seeking a stable distinction in the way things are and
carrying that distinction forward into politics – the result being a tension we must just accept and muddle
through in each fresh case – we have instead, with Rawls, a proposal which represents a systematic and
sensible way of carrying forward these two intuitions (all persons deserve equal respect on one hand,
some differences in outcome tied to talent or effort will be justified, on the other) into the political
sphere. Rawls’ theory pursues the distinctive, and fertile, idea that in politics we must fashion
distinctively political solutions rather than look for what one might call perfect moral clarity and apply it
to the political. But it is the latter that is Williams’ project. Of course, given that this is the task,
Williams reaches impeccably modest, sensible, and non-dogmatic conclusions. He always does.
Reasonable skepticism about the reach of philosophical generalization is Williams’ trademark. But
because he does not consider an entirely different and more fruitful approach in any detail, his virtues in
this regard – and they are undeniable – are overshadowed by being on the wrong road from the start.
Steven Ross
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